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Abstract 
The ancient common law public right to fish has had increasing resonance since 2001 when the High 
Court in Yarmirr denied the existence of asserted exclusive offshore native title rights in large part 
because of the “fundamental inconsistency” between them and the public right to fish. The Yarmirr 
decision also established that non-exclusive offshore native title rights must be consistent with the public 
right. This creates the potential for litigation where it is asserted that actions of native title holders have 
infringed the public right or where recreational anglers purportedly exercising the public right in an area 
subject to a native title determination stray beyond the limits of the right. The public right to fish also 
continues despite exclusive indigenous ownership rights over the foreshore (to the low water mark) 
where ownership rights exist under legislative land grants. Far from being a matter of mere historical 
curiosity, the public right to fish has resurfaced with prominence with respect to its intersection with 
indigenous fishing rights. Further, far from being regulated out of existence, in some jurisdictions the 
public right to fish has been enshrined in legislation. In NSW it has even been extended to non-tidal rivers 
and creeks. This paper examines the content of the public right to fish and assesses its enduring 
significance in light of Yarmirr and post-Yarmirr offshore native title determinations. It argues that the 
confusion surrounding the interaction between public and indigenous fishing rights may necessitate 
Parliamentary action to allocate access rights vis-a-vis public and indigenous fishers. 
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UP THE CREEK AND OUT AT SEA: 
THE RESURFACING OF THE PUBLIC RIGHT TO FISH 




The ancient common law public right to fish has had increasing resonance since 2001 when 
the High Court in Yarmirr denied the existence of asserted exclusive offshore native title 
rights in large part because of the “fundamental inconsistency” between them and the public 
right to fish. The Yarmirr decision also established that non-exclusive offshore native title 
rights must be consistent with the public right. This creates the potential for litigation where it 
is asserted that actions of native title holders have infringed the public right or where 
recreational anglers purportedly exercising the public right in an area subject to a native title 
determination stray beyond the limits of the right. The public right to fish also continues 
despite exclusive indigenous ownership rights over the foreshore (to the low water mark) 
where ownership rights exist under legislative land grants. Far from being a matter of mere 
historical curiosity, the public right to fish has resurfaced with prominence with respect to its 
intersection with indigenous fishing rights. Further, far from being regulated out of existence, 
in some jurisdictions the public right to fish has been enshrined in legislation. In NSW it has 
even been extended to non-tidal rivers and creeks. This paper examines the content of the 
public right to fish and assesses its enduring significance in light of Yarmirr and post-Yarmirr 
offshore native title determinations. It argues that the confusion surrounding the interaction 
between public and indigenous fishing rights may necessitate Parliamentary action to 
allocate access rights vis-a-vis public and indigenous fishers. 
 
Keywords: public right to fish, indigenous fishing rights, offshore native title 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the famous 1992 Mabo decision1 in which the High Court of Australia determined 
that the common law could recognise and afford protection to native title rights over land, the 
scene was set for a future case in which Aboriginal claimants would assert that they had 
native title rights in offshore areas. This duly occurred with the Yarmirr litigation which 
culminated in a complex High Court decision in 2001. A majority found that offshore native 
title rights can exist and be recognised by the common law but they cannot include any 
exclusive rights to control access to claim areas. Exclusive rights were denied because they 
would be fundamentally inconsistent with the public right to fish and navigate, as well as 
Australia’s obligation under international law to allow foreign vessels innocent passage 
through the territorial sea.2 The decision in Yarmirr was applied by the High Court one year 
later. In Ward the Court went one step further and determined that the public rights of fishing 
and navigation had operated to extinguish any claimed exclusive offshore native title rights.3 
Further, the Court determined that the public right to fish is an “other interest” within the 
meaning of s 253 of the Native Title Act 1994 (Cth) and as such it is proper to recognise the 
right within native title determinations. 
These decisions have been profoundly felt within coastal Aboriginal groups, particularly in 
light of the limited recognition and protection of Aboriginal fishing practices within the 
various State and Territory fisheries laws. The decisions have shaped subsequent offshore 
native title claims by limiting claimants to assert only the existence of non-exclusive rights, 
notwithstanding that exclusive rights might exist as a matter of fact within traditional laws. 
This paper considers the content of the public right to fish and its impact on non-exclusive 
offshore native title rights. It also considers a new area of legal uncertainty arising from the 
recent Gumana litigation:4 the implications of the existence of the public right to fish in areas 
subject to land grants under Aboriginal lands rights legislation (where these areas encompass 
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rivers or the foreshore). The current state of the law is unclear and unsatisfactory from both 
legal and practical perspectives. It is contended that legislative action may be needed to better 
delineate rights vis-a-vis indigenous fishers and recreational anglers. 
THE PUBLIC RIGHT TO FISH 
Origin and nature 
The public right to fish is an enduring ancient feature of the common law. The accepted legal 
view is that it has been part of the common law of England since 1215 when the Magna Carta 
restricted the use of royal prerogative powers. One way it did this was to limit the power of 
the King to grant to subjects private fisheries over tidal waters.5 However, the public right to 
fish in tidal waters and the high seas likely predates the Magna Carta in the sense of it having 
been an accepted customary practice of the King’s subjects to fish since time immemorial. 
The obscure origins of the right lie in its ancient practice. Over time the Crown considered 
itself bound to protect the rights of subjects. Therefore, the emergence of the protection 
afforded to the public over their fishing practices subsequently founded the legal right.6   
The public right to fish is substantially different in character from fishing rights created under 
statute. Whereas fisheries legislation typically regulates the activity of fishing (for example, 
the method and time of fishing, who may fish, and the size, quantity and species that may be 
caught), the public right scarcely touches on these issues. It does not, for example, include 
any measures to ensure stock sustainability. Rather, the right, being based on custom, is 
simply that persons may, unless otherwise regulated, fish where and when they like using any 
ordinary fishing method. Further, if persons catch free-swimming fish, those fish enter into 
their legal possession. The right relates to taking and owning free-swimming fish because 
these fish do not belong to anyone.7 A distinction is drawn between free-swimming fish 
(including shellfish) and species that are attached to the seabed. Sedentary species such as 
mussels do not fall within the public right because in law they are seen as part of the seabed. 
The seabed is considered to be a natural extension of land territory to which proprietary rights 
attach. In the case of lands permanently submerged by salt water, proprietary rights are vested 
in the Crown.8 Ownership of the foreshore and riverbeds may be vested in private individuals 
or the Crown. As discussed below, there also exists a large variety of rights incidental to the 
public right to fish. It is these ancillary rights that have prompted the most litigation.9
A limit imposed on the public right to fish is that persons exercising the right must have 
regard to others exercising the right, as well as persons exercising other public rights. The 
main other public right which could lead to dispute is the public right of navigation. Although 
in most situations navigation and fishing rights can be conducted concurrently, if there is 
conflict the right of navigation prevails.10
Landward limit 
The extent to which the public right to fish can extend landwards is important because in 
addition to it determining the upper limit of where the right may be exercised, it also 
determines the lowest point at which private land owners can fish exclusively in waters 
flowing on their land. For example, Aboriginal people are likely to have exclusive fishing 
rights in rivers above the landward limit of the public right if the land under the river is within 
a native title determination or a legislative land grant. 
The public right to fish is (almost) settled to extend landward as far in rivers as there is tidal 
influence.11 This is because the Magna Carta limited the prerogative power of the Crown only 
with respect to the granting of private fishery rights over waters that were “arms of the sea”. 
This is necessarily restricted to tidal waters (and arguably confined further to tidal waters that 
are also navigable). Above the limit of tidal influence the rights of the water follow the owner 
of the solum. The upper limit is the highest point at which the river is affected by the ebb and 
flow of normal (rather than exceptional) tides.12 The debate about whether the public right to 
fish is restricted to tidal portions of navigable rivers focuses on the upper limit of the public 
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right of navigation which is necessarily restricted to navigable tidal waters. However, it seems 
in Australia that the upper limit of the public right to fish does not coincide with this 
boundary. In Gumana (No 2), Mansfield J accepted that the position was that the public right 
to fish existed in tidal waters “whether those waters are navigable or not”.13   
The public right to fish may exist further upstream than the reach of tidal influence if the 
Crown is the owner of the submerged land. This is by virtue of the Crown’s historical 
acquiescence in allowing unlicensed persons access to these waters for the purpose of fishing 
(and inferred by the existence of inland fishing regulations).14 This is the view of the New 
South Wales Parliament in its note to s 3 in the Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW):   
“The public has no common law right to fish in non-tidal waters – the right to fish in 
those waters belongs to the owner of the soil under those waters. However, the public 
may fish in non-tidal waters if the soil under those waters is Crown land.” 
This assumption is also contained in s 38 which extends the public right to fish in New South 
Wales up rivers and creeks where the bed of those rivers and creeks are privately owned. 
Although the section is silent with respect to beds above tidal influence that are owned by the 
Crown, it was assumed by Parliament that the public right continued in waters above them.15 
Walrut goes further and argues that in cases where the Crown has encouraged fisheries 
exploitation in non-tidal rivers where the Crown owns the riverbed (such as the Murray 
River), then it is bound to protect persons exercising the public right to fish.16 Even though it 
can be assumed the public right exists in non-tidal rivers by Crown acquiescence, because 
non-tidal waters are not arms of the sea they are not subject to the qualification on sovereignty 
established in the Magna Carta. This means that the right can be overridden in these waters by 
land grants pursuant to the prerogative (and not just by legislation). 
So, in summary, the public right to fish exists to the ordinary reach of tidal waters, and it 
continues (on a different basis) further up rivers where the Crown owns the submerged land.  
The situation is different in New South Wales where the right has been extended further 
inland by s 38 of the Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW): 
“Right to fish in certain inland waters 
(1) A person may take fish from waters in a river or creek that are not subject to tidal 
influence despite the fact that the bed of those waters is not Crown land if, for the 
purpose of taking those fish, the person is in a boat on those waters or is on the bed of 
the river or creek.” 
Guidance for determining how far this right extends is provided by subsection 38(3): 
“In this section, “bed” of a river or creek includes any part of the bed of the river or 
creek which is alternatively covered and left bare with an increase or decrease in the 
supply of water (other than during floods).” 
Significantly, the exercise of the right is limited to persons either being on a boat or on the 
bed of a river or creek for the purpose of fishing. This limits the right to the core right of 
fishing and precludes the operation of most of the incidental rights (discussed below). Even 
though the section defines “bed” in a non-exhaustive manner by the use of the word 
“includes”, by construing legislation in accordance with the purpose behind it, it would seem 
the correct interpretation is that the upper limit of the right is where a bed can properly be 
described as being “alternatively covered and left bare with an increase or decrease in the 
supply of water (other than during floods).” This nevertheless means that the right is extended 
vast distances up the many rivers and creeks in New South Wales, and through vast areas of 
privately owned farmland. This places a potentially significant burden on freehold landowners 
in the enjoyment of their land where persons seek to exercise the public right in waters 
flowing on their land. This extends to lands acquired by the New South Wales Aboriginal 
Land Council under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW).17
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Seaward limit 
The extension seaward of the public right to fish is less clear. There is an argument that the 
right extends only to the low water mark because the legal recognition of the right is sourced 
in the Magna Carta which limited the exercise of the royal prerogative powers to areas in 
which the Crown claimed sovereignty. In 1876 in R v Keyn the British Court of Crown Cases 
Reserved apparently determined that the limit of British sovereign territory was the low water 
mark.18 It appeared to follow that the low water mark also provided the geographical limit of 
the common law. Therefore, the public right to fish would cease at the low water mark 
because the right is an incident of the common law. However, the majority of the High Court 
in Yarmirr did not confine the exercise of the common law in this way.19 Therefore, it can be 
stated that the public right to fish in Australia extends beyond the low water mark as far as the 
reach of the common law.   
Incidental rights 
Included with the public right to fish is a large collection of ancillary rights. These pertain to 
acts incidental to the exercise of the public right to fish. It is impossible to catalogue the full 
range and scope of these incidental rights. In the first place, because they exist at common 
law, they are only identified when relevant disputes are resolved by court determinations. 
Court decisions only arise when the exercise of a purported right is challenged by an affected 
party (in most cases by an aggrieved owner of land adjacent to the water). For example, the 
question of whether digging for bait on the foreshore was a right ancillary to the public right 
to fish first arose for determination in litigation in 1993.20 Such determinations are necessarily 
confined to their facts. Further, the use of modern fishing practices, both recreational and 
commercial, can differ significantly from the practices in question during the old cases. This 
is relevant because the right is based on custom, and the customary activities of persons 
exercising the right may change over time. Secondly, there has been a dearth of litigation in 
the last century on the public right. Most of the litigation occurred during the 1800s, or 
earlier, long before the development of detailed fisheries legislation which comprehensively 
regulates fishing. This means that because most of the case law on the public right to fish is 
very old and occurred in England and other common law jurisdictions, the cases do not have 
binding force in Australia. However, they may be determined at some point to have been 
received into Australian law. Nevertheless, the cases from other common law jurisdictions 
provide a guide as to the legal position in Australia. A review of the cases leads to the 
following non-exhaustive list of rights incidental to the public right to fish which are likely to 
exist at common law in Australia. The determination of whether a particular activity is a 
lawful public right is a question of fact to be determined by asking whether the activity is 
ancillary (or otherwise necessarily ancillary), to the public right to fish.21
Persons exercising the public right to fish may (subject to any legislative restrictions): 
• use any ordinary mode of fishing;22 
• use as many lines, nets hooks and boats as they please;23  
• take shellfish on the foreshore;24 
• dig for bait, and take worms, on the foreshore if they are intended to be used for bait 
for fishing (but not for commercial purposes);25 
• incidentally use the foreshore (such as drawing and drying nets, and landing boats);26 
• traverse the edge of private land above the high water mark to gain water access at 
high tide; 
• temporarily affix nets to the solum underlying the intertidal waters (foreshore);27 
• pass through the waters of the intertidal zone for the purpose of fishing;28 and 
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• cross the foreshore in order to exercise the right.29 
The right may also extend to mooring a boat temporarily on the foreshore if this is incidental 
to fishing and would not cause damage. 
However, the exercise of the public right to fish, and rights ancillary to them, are subject to a 
number of qualifications: 
• the exercise of them is subject to any regulations; 
• the exercise of the rights must have due regard to the interests of landowners;30 
• persons cannot appropriate the foreshore for their own purposes;31 
• boats may not be left above the high water mark for future use nor may nets be fixed 
to the soil above high water mark; and 
• the exercise of the public right to fish must yield to persons exercising the public right 
of navigation. 
The types of ancillary rights are not closed. Further rights may emerge in future cases. Most 
of the cases will continue to arise where the activities of fishers have been disputed by 
landowners who own land either to the high water mark or the low water mark.  
Legislative curtailment of the public right to fish 
Little attention has been given to the public right to fish in Australia. The right has received 
judicial consideration in only a handful of Australian cases. Few, if any, disputes between 
foreshore owners and persons exercising the right have been litigated, and none have been the 
subject of appellate court decisions. Principally this is because there have been (land rights 
legislation aside), few land grants to the low water mark. This reduces the prospect for dispute 
because landowners cannot assert interference with proprietary rights over the foreshore. 
Another reason why the public right has not featured in court cases in Australia is because it 
has been continually whittled down by fisheries regulations. It is well established that the 
public right to fish is “is freely amenable to abrogation or regulation by a competent 
legislature”.32 There have been legislative restrictions on fishing in Australia from the early 
days of limited colonial self-government. People may now fish pursuant to a statutory fishing 
right rather than rely on the public right. The view that fisheries legislation severely curtails, 
if not abrogates, the right is strongest with respect to commercial fishers who cannot fish 
without a licence. It has been argued that statutory fishing rights have replaced public rights. 
This reasoning could be extended to recreational anglers who in most Australian jurisdictions 
also need to be licensed.   
The degree to which the public right to fish, or ancillary rights, have been curtailed by 
regulations is to be ascertained on a case by case basis in each location as a matter of statutory 
interpretation. This would inevitably produce different results. Abrogation of the public right 
to fish might, for example, extend only to the taking of particular species or during a specified 
period. The question of what is left of the public right depends on the particular circumstances 
in a particular jurisdiction. Notwithstanding various judgments referring to “abrogation” or 
commentators referring to the public right as having been “removed” or “substituted” by 
fisheries regulations,33 it is submitted that it is misleading to say fisheries regulations abrogate 
the public right, at least in its entirety. This view is based first on the statutory interpretation 
rule that a right can only be abrogated with clear intention and secondly because of the nature 
of fishing activities. In most cases aspects of the public right to fish would remain. For 
example, commercial fishers would rely on the public right when they take fish; this not being 
a matter spelled out in legislation. With respect to recreational fishing, each jurisdiction 
provides a number of exemptions from paying the licence fee, such as for children and 
pensioners. These persons when fishing would be exercising the public right because they do 
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not posses statutory fishing licences. Further, most ancillary rights have not been abrogated 
(for example, those rights pertaining to the use of land near the water in the act of fishing). 
Also, some jurisdictions expressly or impliedly confirm the existence of the right (for 
example, New South Wales, Northern Territory, Tasmania, and New Zealand).34 The public 
right cannot be considered to be abrogated if it has been specifically affirmed by Parliament. 
Nevertheless, the public right in many aspects of fishing has been curtailed, such as by 
regulations specifying the daily take of certain species. But the regulations do not cover the 
field. For example, if a jurisdiction has not made regulations with respect to digging for bait 
on the foreshore, this activity would be undertaken pursuant to the public right. Many aspects 
of the public right to fish remain, particularly with respect to recreational fishing. 
Recreational fishing also provides more prospect for disputes with landowners because it 
generally occurs closer inshore and is often associated with other recreational activities.  
Recent Australian judicial recognition of the public right to fish 
The public right to fish in Australia emerged as a minor note in 1975 in New South Wales v 
Commonwealth in which two of the seven High Court judges recognised the existence of the 
right in tidal waters.35 It next emerged in 1989 in the High Court case of Harper v Minister 
for Sea Fisheries in which Brennan J confirmed the existence of the right but noted that it 
does not operate to preserve fisheries from overexploitation. If such a need arises then it is up 
to Parliament to act: 
“The public right of fishing in tidal waters is not limited by the need to preserve the 
capacity of a fishery to sustain itself. The management of a fishery to prevent its 
depletion by the public must be provided for, if at all, by statute.”36
At this point it would seem that the public right to fish has little legal relevance, except that it 
still operates to preclude the Crown (but not Parliament) from granting private property rights 
with respect to land over which tidal waters flow. However, with the common law’s 
recognition of native title since the Mabo decision, the scene was set for a reconsideration of 
the public right in the inevitable decision to follow as to whether native title rights exist 
offshore. In 2001 this issue made its way to the High Court in the Yarmirr case. A majority of 
the High Court found that offshore native title rights can exist (following the Mabo test), but 
the key asserted claim of exclusive rights (as can occur in land native title) cannot be 
recognised by the common law because of the “fundamental inconsistency” between them 
and other existing public rights. As such, the public right to fish was influential in denying the 
recognition of exclusive offshore native title rights. A separate issue arises with respect to 
indigenous fishing rights founded not upon native title but as an incident of exclusive property 
rights granted to Aboriginals under legislative land grants. This is an issue that was by the 
Federal Court in 2005 in Gumama. This litigation produced an unhappy result for Aboriginal 
claimants and left confusion surrounding the operation of the public right to fish. We will next 
consider the two issues of (1) the potential for conflict between persons exercising the public 
right to fish and persons exercising non-exclusive offshore native title rights and (2) the 
intersection of the public right to fish and exclusive fee simple property rights. 
INDIGENOUS FISHING RIGHTS 
Indigenous fishing rights fall into three categories. First, specific fishing rights may be 
granted to indigenous persons in fisheries legislation. The degree to which traditional 
Aboriginal fishing practices have been incorporated into legislation differs markedly across 
Australia. It ranges from simply an exemption from paying the recreational fishing fee in New 
South Wales to specific approval to hunt otherwise protected species such as dugong and 
turtles in Queensland. Such rights are paramount to the public right to fish because they are 
sourced in legislation rather than the common law. The two remaining types of indigenous 
fishing rights are those that are recognised to exist within native title determinations and those 
existing specifically or by implication within an area of legislative Aboriginal land grant over 
which water flows. We consider this with respect to tidal rivers and the foreshore. 
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Offshore native title 
The Yarmirr decision confirmed that native title could extend below the low water mark.37 At 
first sight it seems puzzling that it can be recognised below the low water mark38 because it is 
a “land” right sourced in the doctrine of tenures.39 A narrow majority in Yarmirr determined 
that the common law could recognise native title beyond territorial limits on the basis that the 
common law does not stop at this boundary. Further, the Native Title Act 1994 (Cth) is not 
expressed to apply only within territorial limits, and it would be inconsistent with the purpose 
of the Act to hold that it does. However, unlike terrestrial native title rights, offshore native 
title cannot include exclusive rights to control access to claim areas. This means that offshore 
native title has little content. The most notable feature of offshore native title is that it 
exempts holders from purchasing licences for non-commercial fishing where these are 
required by fisheries legislation. Such fishing needs to be conducted within the other limits 
imposed by general fisheries regulations.40  
The Federal Court applied Yarmirr in Lardil Peoples v Queensland. The court rejected the 
argument that exclusive offshore native title could exist subject to the public rights to fish and 
navigate. This was because the claimed exclusive rights were not qualified in this manner in 
traditional law.41 This means that holders of offshore native title cannot exclude anyone, 
including people not exercising the public rights of fishing and navigation.42 Although 
offshore native title can extend to the conduct of traditional ceremonies at culturally 
significant sites (such as enabling holders to “maintain” places of importance), the exercise of 
this right cannot be done in a manner that excludes other people from the area, including 
recreational anglers.43
The litigation to date confirms that the exercise of offshore native title rights must yield to 
other rights, including the public right to fish.44 This issue may arise in litigation if, for 
example, recreational anglers stray beyond the limits of the public right, for example, by 
utilising land above high water mark (in the absence of necessity) where native title rights 
exist. It is a matter of ongoing grievance for Aboriginals that activities that impinge on 
traditional practices can be conducted in areas within native title determinations. For example, 
non-indigenous recreational take may impact culturally significant species or places. The 
issue is even more complex with respect to the rights that inhere in holders of legislative 
Aboriginal land grants where these extend to the low water mark. 
Legislative land grants to the low water mark 
An issue that was not specifically discussed by the High Court in Yarmirr was the extent of 
rights pursuant to Aboriginal legislative land grants. Land grants can extend to the low water 
mark because this is the extent of the Crown’s territory. This has been done on many 
occasions under land rights legislation. The issue was on point in the 2005 Federal Court case 
of Gumana. In that case, the applicants, holders of land grants under the Aboriginal Land 
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) in part of Blue Mud Bay in Arnhem Land, sought 
to establish that they could exclude fishers and others from the intertidal zone and that the 
Northern Territory lacks legislative and executive power to issue fishing licences within the 
intertidal zone and the adjacent sea within two kilometres of the low water mark.   
The late Justice Selway heard the case. It was his view that the traditional owners had the 
power to exclude all others from the area within the low water mark (including the waters that 
flow over the intertidal zone) pursuant to their rights as landowners in fee simple (the 
strongest form of proprietary right).45 However, Selway J was unable to hold that this was the 
case because the matter was not free from judicial authority. He was bound to follow the 
decision of the Full Federal Court in Yarmirr.46 As such, he held that fee simple in the 
foreshore “is qualified in that the rights of the applicants do not include rights to exclude 
those exercising public rights to fish or navigate”.47
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A shortcoming of this expression of the law is that it is unclear on what basis the decision is 
made. Selway J considered himself bound to follow Yarmirr, yet the judgment in Yarmirr did 
not elaborate reasons for its decision on this point. There are two options to explain the 
determination that land ownership to the low water mark must yield to public rights. The first 
is that land grants strictly pertain to land and have no application to overlying waters. In this 
case, the holders of the grant would have no right to stop anyone on the water in the 
foreshore, no matter what they were doing there (but it would be a trespass to place anything 
on the submerged land, such as an anchor). However, this qualification of proprietary rights 
would need to continue into inland waters because there is no legal basis to distinguish river 
water and tidal water.48 This poses great conceptual difficulties with respect to airspace. 
Airspace to a reasonable height falls within the exclusive use of landowners. Does this mean 
landowners can control access over the land and airspace, but not the water column between 
them? Are landowners unable to be control airspace above incoming tidal waters? Can 
landowners exclude everyone from the foreshore at low tide, but people may enter while on 
the water during an incoming tide? Could landowners build a jetty over the foreshore but 
prevent recreational fishers from using it? This option, which involves complex vertical 
stratification of landowners’ rights and a possible ever-moving boundary with incoming and 
outgoing tides, would create interminable confusion. This leaves the second option: land 
ownership includes the right to exclude others from the foreshore except persons exercising 
the right to fish or navigate, or ancillary rights.49 This option is also problematic: landowners 
could exclude other persons (such as bathers) from these waters where their activities were 
not pursuant to a paramount common law right. Yet the legal basis for this option is suspect. 
It involves a legislative proprietary right yielding to fragile common law rights which only 
restrict the use of prerogative (not legislative) powers. However, this option better reflects 
persons’ legal rights in the sense that people with no legal right to be in the foreshore, such as 
bathers, can be excluded by landowners. This option would mean that, for example, 
proprietors of the solum could sue passers by who take mussels. This would bring the public 
right to the fore and would require elucidation of what activities properly fall within the right, 
and what is entailed by having “due regard” to the interests of landowners. People straying 
beyond the right would be liable to actions in trespass, and possibly nuisance.50 It also means 
landowners cannot use the foreshore in any manner that would impede the exercise of the 
public right to fish.51 Both options are legally suspect and present practical difficulties. 
The lack of clarity surrounding the intersection of the public right to fish and proprietary 
rights is significant in terms of the interests at stake and potential litigation. Approximately 80 
per cent of the Northern Territory coastline is subject to legislative land grants.52 These can 
extend to the low water mark and be in the form of fee simple. The intertidal zone in northern 
Australia covers enormous areas because of large tidal movements. Much of this area is 
popular for the recreational fishing sector, as well as commercial fishing. 
CONCLUSION 
There is great confusion regarding the rights of holders of land grants to the low water mark. 
Although we have a ruling in Gumana that their rights are subject to the public right to fish, in 
2002 the High Court considered the question of whether holders of fee simple have the right 
to control access to the superjacent water but left the question unresolved.53 The Gumana case 
is currently being appealed to the Full Federal Court and there is every prosect of the matter 
finding its way to the High Court. If that occurs then we can expect an authoritative ruling on 
this point. Selway J’s reasoning in Gumana is compelling from a legal perspective, but it is 
unlikely to be welcomed by recreational and commercial inshore fishers. Each of the three 
options available to the highest appellate court about the extent of legislative land rights to the 
low water mark (1. exclusive; 2. exclusive subject to common law public rights; 3. exclusive 
but inapplicable to the water column) have significant ramifications for users of the intertidal 
zone. The court will be faced essentially with a policy choice if it decides to read down 
property rights. Australian Parliaments have abdicated to the courts the responsibility to 
elucidate native title rights,54 and this is also the case with respect to land grants. The 
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inevitable tension that will arise from the final determination in Gumana is likely to demand a 
legislative response. Should the High Court affirm Selway J’s judgment, consideration should 
be given to legislatively preclude recreational and commercial take from within some areas of 
legislative land grants in a manner similar to marine protected areas (for example with respect 
to species or places that are especially significant for indigenous communities). However, 
should the High Court adopt Selway J’s preferred view, there will be strong calls for 
legislation that eliminates the prospect of all recreational and commercial fishers being 
excluded from the vast areas of the intertidal zone that are within legislative land grants.  
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